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Abstract
We study how the prevailing internal organization of the family aﬀected the initial
design of pension systems. Our theoretical framework predicts that, in society with
weak family ties, pensions systems were introduced to act as a safety net, while in
societies with strong ties they replicate the tight link between generations by provid-
ing generous benefits. Using a historical classification of family ties, we show that in
societies dominated by (weak ties) absolute nuclear families (f.i. Anglo-Saxon coun-
tries), safety net pension systems emerged; and viceversa in societies dominated by
strong families. These results are robust to controlling for alternative legal, religious,
and political explanations. Evidence on individual data confirm these findings: US
citizens whose ancestors came from countries featuring strong ties (communitarian or
egalitarian nuclear) families prefer to rely on the government as a provider of old age
security through generous retirement benefits.
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"Ergo age, care pater, cervici inponere nostrae:
Ipse subibo umeris nec me labor iste gravabit.
Quo res cumque cadent, unum et commune periclum"
(Aeneis1, liber secundus)
1 Introduction
Institutions matter. A growing literature has emphasized the impact of pre-existing legal,
political and economic institutions on economic development, income inequality, living
arrangements and even fertility decisions (see, among the others, Putnam, 1993, Tabellini,
2008 and 2009, Acemoglu et al., 2001, North, 1990, La Porta et al., 1997, Fernandez and
Fogli, 2009, Guiso et al., 2006). Whether these historical institutions aﬀect social-economic
outcomes through their impact on current institutions or through a less tangible, cultural
transmission process is instead less understood (Tabellini, 2009).
In this paper, we focus on the role of what is arguably the primal institution: the
family. We emphasize the economic relevance of the historical patterns of the within
family organization. The organization of the family structure includes the relation between
parents and kids, from their childhood till their parents’ old age; the relation among
siblings; and the relation between the family as a unit and the society at large. These
primal aspects of the family organization can be transmitted over time, codified in the
law, and even embedded into newly born economic institutions. Our point of departure
is that when the family is substituted in one of its economic roles by a new institution,
the economic organization that was prevailing within the family is likely to be adopted
by the new-born institution. To study this transmission mechanism from family culture
(or organization) to economic institutions, we concentrate on the impact of the family
structure on the design of the most widely spread welfare state program in the world: the
public pension system.
Before the introduction of public pension systems, which largely occurred between the
beginning of the XX century and the aftermath of world war II, families were typically the
unique providers of old-age security for their elderly members. Yet, the organization of
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"Haste, my dear father, (’t is no time to wait,)
And load my shoulders with a willing freight.
Whate’er befalls, your life shall be my care;
One death, or one deliv’rance, we will share".
(Aeneas to his father Anchises, in Virgil’s Aeneid, second book)
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the within-family insurance system largely diﬀered across regions and family types. While
in some countries, such as England, adults had no legal obligation to support their elderly
parents, in France they were morally, but also legally reliable for their elderly parents’
health and economic situations (see Twigg and Grand, 1998). In the latter case, parents
could rely on their oﬀsprings for complete old age support, to an extent that of course
depended on their own and on their kids’ economic conditions. In the former case, instead,
upward vertical support (from the kids to their parents) was less common, and mostly
consisted of a safety net, whenever parents fell into poverty. Our goal is thus to understand
to what extent the principles governing the within family organization have influenced the
original design of pension systems. Interestingly, those fundamental characteristics are still
present in the current systems, and largely diﬀer across countries. Did the initial design
of pension systems mirror the within family organization? Did countries characterized by
families providing strong vertical old age support favor the introduction of earning-related
insurance schemes, which replace a large share of the workers’ previous wage? And did
countries characterized by weak family responsibility for the well being of the elderly
endorse flat-rate pension schemes providing only an old age safety net?
To answer these fundamental questions, we introduce a two-periods OLG model that
examines the link between family structure and pensions design. We consider two family
structures featuring weak or strong ties, and hence diﬀerent within family organizations.
Pension design can be of two types: a redistributive Beveridgean scheme and an earning-
related Bismarckian system. We also study two economic and demographic scenarios. In
an "old regime", family members lived close to one another and the cost of providing
resources to the elderly was small. In a "new regime", arising for instance from industri-
alization, urbanization and similar processes, which induced nuclearization of the family,
family members tend to be more spread out geographically, and the cost of transferring
resources to the elderly increases.2 Our model shows that, in the "old regime", no pension
system is introduced, and adults take care of their family obligations towards their parents
through private transfers. In the "new regime", pensions emerge under both family types.
In societies with strong ties families, a Bismarckian scheme provides comprehensive and
generous benefits that come to substitute the adults-to-old-parents family transfers. Also
in societies with weak ties families, pensions reflect the pre-existing family organization
2 Interestingly, the timing and the degree of urbanization may depend on the strength of the family ties.
In fact, in societies featuring weak families, individuals may have lower costs of moving to the cities, and
the industrialization process may have begun earlier, thus creating a demand for old age pensions. Here,
we disregard the timing of events, and concentrate on the original design of the pension system regardless
of its year of introduction.
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and thus a Beveridgean system oﬀering only a safety net emerges.
To test the predictions of our model on how the diﬀerent within family organizations
shape the initial pension design, we use a historical classification of medieval family types
(Todd, 1983). Family organizations are divided in four types - absolute nuclear, egali-
tarian nuclear, authoritarian, communitarian - which deliver a complete picture of the
family relationships in the world since the medieval era. Absolute nuclear families, which
represent the dominating type in Anglo-Saxon countries, Holland and Denmark, display
the weaker ties. The high degree of independence among family members is due to the
fact that parents-adult kids cohabitation is uncommon, and parents are unconstrained in
their inheritance decisions. The stronger ties are in communitarian families. Here, family
constraints are tight since cohabitation is the norm and parents have to obey to strict
inheritance rules, requiring equality among siblings. Egalitarian nuclear and authoritar-
ian families represent intermediate cases of family interdependence. In egalitarian nuclear
families, the parents-kids relation is shaped by strict equalitarian norms in the inheritance
rules. In authoritarian families, parents have more freedom of decision, but cohabitation
is the norm. We show this historical classification of the strength of the family ties to
be in line with Alesina and Giuliano (2007) recent work on family types based on World
Value Survey individual data. In countries characterized by strong ties (communitarian
and egalitarian nuclear) families, individuals display more respect for their parents3 than
in absolute nuclear, after controlling for individual characteristics.
The design of the pension system is classified according to the replacement rates,
which measure the ratio between pension benefits and labor income prior to retirement,
for diﬀerent income levels. If a pension system replaces a constant proportion of the
workers’ income, these replacement rates will be roughly constant across income levels.
On the other hand, they will widely diﬀer - being higher for low-income workers, if the
pension system acts as a safety net.4
Our empirical findings suggest that in countries where (weak ties) absolute nuclear
families prevail, pension schemes act mainly as a flat safety net. This link between fam-
ily types and pension design is robust to controlling for alternative explanations of the
3 In particular, they are more likely to repond that “Regardless of what the qualities and faults of one’s
parents are, one must always love and respect them” rather than “One does not have the duty to respect
and love parents who have not earned it by their behavior and attitudes”.
4Pension schemes with an earnings-related formula are typically referred to as "Bismarckian" systems,
while flat-rate ones as "Beveridgean" systems. See Disney and Johnson (2001), Conde-Ruiz and Profeta
(2007), OECD(2005) for a classification of current pension systems according to their redistributive design
and Conde-Ruiz and Profeta (2007), Koethenburger et al. (2008) for political-economy explanations of
their diﬀerent nature.
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introduction of the pension systems, such as legal origin, religion, urbanization and de-
mocratization of the country at the time of the introduction, current GDP, share of elderly
in the population, electoral rules and forms of government. Interestingly, historical family
types aﬀect the design of the pension systems, which constitutes a persistent feature, but
not their level of spending, which has instead largely changed over time.
A simple comparison may help to appreciate the relevance of the family organization
in shaping the design of pension systems. Consider four, geographically close countries
characterized by the same (Scandinavian) legal origin, such as Denmark, Finland, Norway
and Sweden. According to Todd (1983) classification, Norway and Sweden featured au-
thoritarian families, Finland was characterized by a communitarian family structure, while
Denmark was based on absolute nuclear families. Also the design of their pension system
diﬀers. With a ratio of the pension replacement rates across income levels (respectively
at 75% and at 150% of the average wage) equal to 1.6, and an average replacement rate
of 54%, the weak-ties-family Denmark stands out for its safety net, highly redistributive
pension system. Norway and Sweden also have somewhat redistributive (their ratio of
replacement rates across income being respectively 1.25 and 1.09), but more generous sys-
tems, with an average replacement rate equal to 65.1% and to 68.2%. On the other hand,
Finland, which is characterized by a communitarian family structure, features a perfectly
Bismarckian pension system (the ratio of replacement rates across income is equal to 1),
with an average replacement rate of 78.8%.
The empirical analysis on individual data confirms these cross-country results. Follow-
ing a growing literature (see Fernández and Fogli, 2006, 2009, and Alesina and Giuliano,
2007, among many others), we use individual responses to questions on the role of the
government in providing support to the elderly, which were available in the 1972-2008
waves of the General Social Survey (GSS). To avoid reverse causality problems, due for
instance to the use of welfare state programs aﬀecting the family organization (or type),
we choose not to classify individuals into family types according to their responses to GSS
questions on the importance of the family. Instead, we associate to each person the family
type which was prevailing in his family’s country of origin. We find that individuals whose
ancestors came from countries featuring strong ties (communitarian or egalitarian nuclear)
families prefer more generous state-provided retirement benefits than those from weak ties
(absolute nuclear) families.
Additionally, we exploit the regional (within-country) variation in Todd (1990) classi-
fication of family types for three countries (Finland, Portugal and the UK) to test whether
individuals living in diﬀerent regions of the same country have diﬀerent views on public
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pension policies. Using individual data from a European Value Survey question on the
role of the state in pension policy, we show that individuals living in regions of the UK
that feature weak ties families support individual responsibility for old age pension over
state intervention, whereas those living in regions with stronger family ties favor state
responsibility. In Finland and Portugal, all regions feature strong ties families — namely
authoritarian and communitarian in Finland, and egalitarian nuclear and authoritarian in
Portugal, and no diﬀerence emerge when comparing individuals from diﬀerent regions.
A recent literature has analyzed the role of the family as a primal institution aﬀecting
economic outcomes, and its role of intergenerational transmission of culture. For instance,
Alesina and Giuliano (2007) claim that the strength of family ties represents a fundamen-
tal cultural trait shaping economic behavior and attitudes. They elaborate a measure of
culture based on family relationships and quantify its role in explaining important eco-
nomic variables, such as the amount of home production versus market activities and the
role of women. A previous argument by Reher (1998) also pointed out that family ties help
explaining living arrangements and geographical mobility of young generations. Indeed,
the link between family types and individual economic behavior dates back to Banfield
(1958), who first used the term "amoral family" to describe the social and cultural envi-
ronment that was shaping individual decisions in a small village in the south of Italy. More
recently, Duranton et al. (2009) used Todd’s (1990) classification of family structures to
explain regional diﬀerences in economic outcomes. Algan and Cahuc (2007) shows that
family culture is responsible for cross-country heterogeneity in employment rates. Alesina
et al. (2010) argue that in countries with strong ties families individuals are less mobile
and prefer more regulated labor market while weak ties families are associated with more
flexible labor markets, which then require higher geographic mobility of workers to be ef-
ficient.5 All these papers consider the family culture to be persistent over time. Bisin and
Verdier (2001) and Tabellini (2008) endogenize this cultural transformation mechanism
by showing how rational, altruistic parents may optimally choose to transmit their family
values to their children.
The link between family relations and welfare systems has also received a recent at-
tention, mainly by sociologists. Focusing on Europe, Esping-Andersen (1999) argues that
where family ties are stronger, social risks are typically internalized within the family by
pooling resources across generations. Other authors have stressed the impact of gender
5The impact of cultural factors on individual economic decisions is also addressed by Guiso, Sapienza
and Zingales (2006), who analyze as a specific example the impact of religion or ethnic origins on trust and
on preferences for redistribution. See also Fernández (2007) for a survey of some of the recent empirical
studies on the eﬀects of culture on economic outcomes.
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culture on the welfare state (Lewis, 1992) and the role of Christian religion in European
welfare state (Daly, 1997). Coleman (1988) argues that family ties can strengthen the sup-
port received by young generations from the old while, at the same time, representing an
obstacle for innovation and new ideas. Finally, Pfau-Eﬃnger (2005) emphasizes the link
between culture and welfare state policies, as she argues that welfare state policies diﬀer
according to the underlying cultural model of the family, and to how much importance is
attributed to the family for the production of welfare.
This paper is also related to a recent literature on the origin of welfare. According to
several authors (for a discussion, see Caucutt, Cooley and Guner, 2007, and Cutler and
Johnson,2004), Pay-As-You-Go pension systems that feature intergenerational transfers
from workers to retirees were introduced in the western world around the period of urban-
ization. The rationale for the creation of a public transfer system was the rapid change
from the existence of an extended family living in the same house to smaller families dis-
located in many diﬀerent places, due to the urbanization. In this new setup, kids became
increasingly unable to look after their parents and to take care of their old age needs, and
new forms of insurance had to be introduced. Yet, this theory has hard time matching the
timing of the urbanization process with the introduction of social security systems (see
e.g., Lindert, 1994, and Perotti and Schwienbacker, 2007). Our relation between family
types and the initial design of the social security system instead does not rest on a specific
date for the introduction of social security.
The paper is organized as follows: section 2 explains the model, section 3 presents the
historical classification in family types based on Todd (1983), and discusses the origins of
pension systems and their design; sections 4 and 5 describe our econometric analyses and
results. Section 6 concludes. Proofs are in the Appendix.
2 The Model
We introduce a simple two-periods OLGmodel to analyze the link between family structure
and pension design. We consider two stylized family structures: strong and weak ties
family. These two structures diﬀer in the rule defining the degree of insurance within
the family. Pension design can be of two types. Bismarckian systems provide the retirees
with pension benefits that are strongly linked to the individuals’ previous working income.
Beveridgean schemes instead feature flat pension benefits, which are largely independent
of the individuals’ previous contributions.
We also consider two diﬀerent scenarios. In an initial "old regime", family members
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and relatives tend to live close to one another. Hence, regardless of the family structure,
the cost of looking after a family member — namely the elderly — is relatively low. In a
"new regime," driven for instance by industrialization, urbanization and similar processes,
in which a nuclearization of the family has occurred, looking after the old has become
more costly in both weak and strong ties families.6
The next section characterizes these two family structures. Section 2.2 describes the
two types of pension design and the political process leading to the determination of the
pension design and of the level of pension spending. The economic and political decisions
taken by the adults in the strong family types, both in the "old" and the "new" regimes
are examined in section 2.3. An analysis of these decisions in weak families follows.
2.1 Family structures
In every period, two generations of equal size are alive: adult and old. Adults earn an
income  ∈ [ ]. Individuals hence diﬀer in their income, which is distributed in the
population according to a cumulative distribution function  (), with median income,
 , and mean income, . Children are assumed to have the same income as their parents,
so we consider dynasties of equal income, . Adults may save, , in order to increase
the resources in old age. Returns from savings, denoted by , are uncertain. With a
probability , individuals enjoy high returns,  = , while with probability (1 − ) the
returns are low,  = , with   . It is convenient, but not crucial, to assume that
 = 0. Thus, the average returns from savings are  Old individuals do not work. They
obtain the returns from their savings, , and may receive a pension, .
We consider a logarithmic utility function in youth and old age consumption. A type-
individual born at time  has the following utility function
 ¡ +1¢ = ln  +  ln +1 (1)
where superscripts indicate the generation (adult, old), subscripts refer to the income type
and to the time period and  is the subjective discount factor. Economic decisions are
taken by the adults.
In strong ties families, the adults have a moral (or perhaps even legal) obligation
to provide an adequate level of consumption to the old. We capture this obligation by
6The family type may also aﬀect individual mobility (see Alesina et al., 2010) and hence the timing
of urbanization. Eventually, however, most countries have reached a certain degree of urbanization and
pension system have been introduced.
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imposing a constraint on the old consumption, as a function of the adults income:
 ≥  (2)
Hence, regardless of the elderly private wealth, adults have to make sure that the elderly
family members enjoy a substantial consumption level, corresponding to a (large) percent-
age  of their income, . This is to capture the idea that in a family with strong ties,
adults have to guarantee to their parents a standard of living, which is similar to their
own. Hence, the adults’ budget constraint in a strong ties family is:
 +  =
( (1−  )
(1−  )− ¡1 + ¢ ( −  − −1) if  + −1 ≥ otherwise (3)
where   is a proportional tax paid by the adults on their income,  is the pension
benefits received by a type- old individual at time , and  represents the deadweight
cost of providing private resources to the old family members in the old ( = ) and in
the new regime ( = ).
This cost of providing resources to the parents is assumed to be negligible in the old
regime,  = 0, but to be positive in the new regime,  =   0, where families are
more geographically disperse.
In families with weak ties, adults still have a moral (or legal) obligation, but only to
keep the old family members above a subsistence consumption level. This limited degree of
within family insurance is represented by the following constraint on old age consumption:
 ≥  (4)
where  is the average income in the economy, and   1 defines the poverty level with
respect to the average income. The adults’ budget constraint in a weak ties family becomes:
 +  =
( (1−  )
(1−  )− (1 + ) ( −  − −1)
if  + −1 ≥ 
otherwise
(5)
2.2 Pension Design
We consider two stylized PAYG pension schemes. In both systems, adults pay a propor-
tional tax   on their income, , and these revenues are entirely used to provide pension
benefits, , to the elderly. Hence, these schemes are assumed to be budget-balanced.
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Moreover, pensions are distortionary, as captured by a parameter   0, which measures
the deadweight cost of using pensions.
In a Bismarckian system, pension benefits are proportional to the individuals’ income:
 =  (1− ) (6)
Hence, all individuals receive the same pension replacement rate — as defined by the ratio
of current pension to previous income — which is equal to  =   =  (1− ).
In a Beveridgean scheme, pension benefits are instead flat, that is, they are not related
to the individuals’ income, but rather to the average income in the economy, as defined
by the following expression:
 =  =  (1− ) (7)
This scheme thus features redistribution from high to low income individuals. In fact,
the pension replacement rate is equal to  =   =  (1− ), and is thus
decreasing in income.
Notice that, regardless of the pension design, the return from pensions for the average
individual (i.e., the individual with the average income) at steady state, that is, for a
constant tax rate, is equal to 1− . In line with the existing literature on social security,
we assume the average return from private savings to be larger than this (safe) average
return from pensions; hence,   1− .
The decisions over the design — whether Bismarckian or Beveridgean — and the size
— i.e., the tax rate — of the pension system are taken sequentially at majority voting. In
every period, individuals first decide whether to have a Bismarckian or a Beveridgean
scheme in place, and then which social security tax rate to impose. Political players (i.e.,
voters) are assumed to be all adult individuals. Current decisions over the design and the
size of the pension system do not bind future generations, but can rather be modified by
future adults.
At this juncture, it is convenient to lay down some assumptions on the income distri-
bution and on the pension system that will be used in the next sections.
Assumption 1  ∈ [(1− )  ]
This assumption acknowledges the income distribution to be skewed, but at the some
time, it requires this distribution not to be so disperse as to induce pension spending for
pure redistributive reasons.
Assumption 2 For   0, i.e., in the new regime, (1− ) (1 + )  1
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This assumption restricts the private intra-family transfers in the new regime to be
more costly for the adult members of the average family than using the distortionary
pension system. Thereby, it provides a rational for pension transfers to be introduced in
the new regime.
In the following sections, we analyze the economic and political decisions taken in
families with strong and weak ties in the "old" and in the "new" regime.
2.3 Strong ties families
In strong ties families, adult individuals are required to ensure to the elderly members of
the family an adequate level of consumption, in line with the family income. The saving
decisions by the adults hence entail a strategic component. In fact, adults anticipate that
if they will lack a suﬃcient amount of old age resources (due to low savings or to a bad
realization of the returns), the future generation will have to step in and provide them
with a consumption at least equal to . As a result, adults will only be willing to save
if the level of old age consumption ensured by the family, as measured by , is suﬃciently
small (see Proposition 2).
To analyze the political choice over the design and the size of the pension system, it
is convenient to consider first the case of no private old age resource. This may occur
either because the elderly decided not to save when they were adults, or because of a
bad realization of the returns. Current adults have to choose whether to take care of the
consumption of the elderly members of the family through a pension system or through
private transfers. In taking this political decision, they understand that their choice does
not bind future voters on the pension system that they may enjoy during their old age.
In every period, individuals decide first whether to have a Bismarckian or a Beveridgean
scheme in place, and then which social security tax rate to support. It is thus convenient
to analyze the problem backward. We begin by examining the political equilibrium tax
rate respectively under a Bismarckian and a Beveridgean system; and we then turn to the
pension design decision.
Bismarckian System
In a Bismarckian system, pension benefits are proportional to family income. Hence,
a tax rate of  =  (1− ) would command an individual pension benefit of  = ,
which would allow elderly individuals in every family to reach their family consumption
level, . It is easy to see that using a Bismarckian pension system is more convenient
than the alternative family transfers in the new regime, i.e., when (1− ) (1 + )  1;
11
but not in the old regime. Hence, a Bismarckian system, characterized by  =  (1− ),
would only be supported in the new regime.
Beveridgean System
In a Beveridgean system, pension benefits are instead flat. Therefore, the tax rate
that provides enough pension benefits to an elderly family member to finance her fam-
ily consumption level () depends on the family income. In particular, we have   =
 (1− )  in order to achieve  =  (1 − ) = . A pension system with this
tax rate,  , is preferred to private family transfers by the individuals with an income
below the following threshold:   (1− ) . Hence, according to assumption 1, in the
old regime a majority of the individuals prefers to finance the consumption of their family
old members through private transfers, and no Beveridgean pension system emerges.
In the new regime, instead, a majority of the individuals would prefer their own most
preferred tax rate,  , to the private transfer. Interestingly, this tax rate is increasing
with the income of the adults as long as   (1− ) (1 + ) . Above this threshold, adult
individuals prefer to use the private family transfer and vote for a zero tax rate, due to the
redistributive nature of the pension scheme. As described in the proposition below, in the
new regime an "ends-against-the-middle" equilibrium thus emerges, in which high-income
(i.e., with   (1− ) (1 + ) ) and low income adults support low pension spending (or
no spending), while middle income adults prefer higher pensions.
Proposition 1 Under the "old" regime, a Beveridgean pension system is not supported.
Under the "new" regime, in absence of private old-age wealth,  = 0, a Beveridgean
pension system emerges as a political economic equilibrium of a voting game and is char-
acterized by a tax rate  = (1−) , where  is such that  ( ) =  (e) − 12 , ande = (1− ) (1 + ) .
Pension Design
In the old regime, individuals always prefer to ensure consumption to their old family
members through private within family transfer; and thus no pension system will emerge.
In the new regime, introducing a pension system becomes a more convenient option, due
to the increase in the cost of within family resource provision (see assumption 2). Yet, will
adult individuals prefer the more generous Bismarckian system (notice that    )
or the more redistributive Beveridgean scheme?
Low income individuals (   ) clearly prefer a redistributive Beveridgean system,
which allows them to transfer part of the cost of supporting their parents’ consumption
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to the richer adults. By the same argument, high income individuals prefer instead a
Bismarckian system. For middle income individuals — for instance with  ∈ (  ) —
the Beveridgean system does not provide enough resources to ensure the required family
level of old age consumption, , and the adults have to supplement the pension benefits
with family transfers. This creates a clear trade-oﬀ. On one hand, these adults benefit from
the redistributive component of the Beveridgean system; on the other hand, however, they
have to use the less eﬃcient family transfer to top-up their parents’ insuﬃcient pension
benefits. As characterized in the next proposition, an income threshold exists above which
adult individuals prefer a Bismarckian system, and viceversa.
Proposition 2 Under the "old" regime, no pension system is in place. Under the "new"
regime, in absence of private old age wealth,  = 0 ∀, (i) if  ≥ b = + − ,
a Bismarckian pension system with  = (1−) emerges, and it is supported in all
future periods if  ≥ 
(1+)(1+ 1)+(1−)
; and (ii) if   b, a Beveridgean pension
system with  = (1−) emerges, and it is supported in all future periods if  ≥

(1+)(1+ 1)+ (1−)
.
The above proposition suggests that, in the new regime, when the income distribution
is not as skewed as to lead to a large demand for redistribution, a Bismarckian system
emerges that provides the elderly — who lack private wealth — with the exact amount
of resources to enjoy the family ensured level of consumption. If the consumption level
guaranteed by the family is suﬃciently large, as summarized by the parameter , adults
individuals will choose not to save for future consumption, and will thus reach old age
with no private wealth,  = 0. A corresponding Bismarckian system will thus continue
to be supported. If instead, the income distribution is suﬃciently spread out, the demand
for redistribution dominates, and a Beveridgean system emerges, which will continue to
be supported if individuals — as previously explained — will choose not to save for future
consumption.
2.4 Weak ties families
In weak ties families, adult individuals are required to guarantee to their family elderly
members only a subsistence consumption level, , which is independent of the adults’
income. Providing resources to the elderly is costly in the "new" regime (  0), but not
in the "old" regime.
As before, adults act strategically. They anticipate that if they choose not to save,
they will reach old age with no private wealth and will thus be supported by their future
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adult family members, who will ensure them the subsistence consumption level, . Thus,
adults will only be willing to save if this subsistence consumption level is low enough,
given their family income (see Proposition 3).
As in section 2.3, we begin our analysis of the political choice over the design and size
of the pension system by focusing on the case of no private old age resource. We study the
problem backward: first, we analyze the political equilibrium tax rate respectively under a
Bismarckian and a Beveridgean system, and we then turn to the pension design decision.
Bismarckian System
In a Bismarckian system, pension benefits are proportional to family income:  =
(1 − ). Yet, adult individuals only need to guarantee the constant subsistence con-
sumption level, , to their parents. Hence, adults of diﬀerent income will choose diﬀerent
tax rate to achieve this goal. More specifically, every type- individual will support a tax
rate   =  (1− )  in the "new" regime, since (1− ) (1 + )  1, while no Bismarck-
ian pension system would be supported in the "old" regime. In the new regime, since the
most preferred tax rate is decreasing in income, the political equilibrium Bismarckian tax
rate chosen by the median income adult will correspond to  =  (1− )  .
Beveridgean System
In a Beveridgean system, pension benefits are instead flat; and so is the subsistence
consumption level that has to be provided to the elderly members in the family. Hence, a
tax rate equal to  =  (1− ) would command an individual pension benefit of  =
 = , thereby allowing elderly individuals in every family to meet the subsistence
consumption level. Using this Beveridgean pension system is more convenient than private
family transfers for low income individuals, with an income such that   (1− ) (1 + ) ,
and viceversa for richer adults. Since (1− ) (1 + )  1, and   , in the "new"
regime, the median income voter will support the system, and a Beveridgean system with
 =  (1− ) will emerge. No Beveridgean pension system would emerge in the old
regime, since, by assumption 1,   (1− ) .
Pension Design
In the old regime, individuals always prefer to use private, within family transfers to
ensure the subsistence consumption level to their old family members, and thus no pension
system is introduced. In the new regime, pension systems become more convenient, due
to the higher cost of providing resources within the family, and all individuals prefer
to support the Beveridgean system. To see this, notice that the equilibrium tax rate
emerging in a Bismarckian system is higher than the one under a Beveridgean system.
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Yet, while in the Beveridgean system, for all families, the pension benefits cover exactly
the subsistence consumption level,  = ; in the Bismarckian system the subsistence
level (and indeed an even higher consumption) is ensured only to those individuals whose
income is above the median, since  = (1− ) = (). Poorer individuals —
those with below median income — have to top-up the Bismarckian pensions with costly
private transfers to their parents. The Beveridgean system is thus supported by all adults.
Below median income adults contribute less and obtain a higher pension for their parents;
whereas above median income adults obtain the same subsistence consumption level for
their parents in both systems, but pay lower contributions in the Beveridgean system.
The next proposition summarizes these results.
Proposition 3 Under the "old" regime, no pension system is in place. Under the "new"
regime, in absence of private old age wealth,  = 0 ∀, a Beveridgean pension system
with  = (1−) always emerges, and it is supported in all future periods if  ≤  =
(1+)(1+ 1)
(1− 1−)
. If   , for  = , there is no pension spending,  = 0.
The above proposition suggests that, in the new regime, when individuals have no
private old age wealth,  = 0, a Beveridgean pension system dominates. In a society of
weak ties families, with a Beveridgean system in place, medium and high income adults
individuals (  ) find still convenient to save in order to increase their old age con-
sumption in the good state (i.e., when  = ), while poorer individuals do not. If a good
state actually occurs, middle and high income adults individuals (  ) will thus have
enough old age private resources to cover the subsistence consumption level, and no family
intervention is required. Hence, if the median voter is suﬃciently poor ( ≤ ), her
parents will not have enough old age private wealth and a Beveridgean pension system
will be supported. On the other hand, if the median voter is suﬃciently rich (  ),
no pension system will be supported, and low income individuals will have to finance their
parents’ subsistence consumption level with private transfers. In this scenario, (  ),
the system will oscillate between  =  when  = 0, and  = 0 when  = .
The analysis of the family organization in the "old" and "new" regime for the strong
and weak ties families provides interesting insights. While no pension system will exist in
the "old" regime, a pension scheme typically emerges under the "new" regime. Societies
with weak ties families always support less generous, yet more redistributive Beveridgean
schemes; whereas Bismarckian systems can only appear in societies with strong ties fami-
lies. In the empirical session, we will concentrate on a particular measure of the design of
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pension systems: the ratio between replacement rates at diﬀerent incomes. This is given
by  =  with  6= , where  = . In a pure Bismarckian system, where
 =  (1− ) , this ratio is equal to one,  = 1. In a pure Beveridgean system,
instead, where  =  (1− ) , this measure is  =  = . Hence, for
instance, the ratio between replacement rates at 75% of the average income and at 150%
of the average income should be equal to 2, as  = 1575 = 2.
3 Historical perspectives on family ties and pension system
design
3.1 Family types
Characterizing the internal organization of the family, the relations between parents and
children, among children, and between the family and the society at large, represents a
diﬃcult task. A recent literature (see Alesina and Giuliano, 2007) has used survey data
on individual responses to questions on the relevance of the family, on the time spent with
relatives, and on living arrangements to provide a quantitative measure of these family
ties. Yet, while current relations within and across families are certainly shaped by cultural
factors, they are also largely influenced by the incentives provided by economic and legal
institutions, such as labor market regulations, tax code and the welfare state. To evaluate
the primal eﬀect of the family organization on the initial design of the welfare state, we
thus need to use measurements of the family organization dating back to periods prior
to the introduction of welfare state policies. A historical classification of family ties is
in Todd (1983), who used historical monographs sometimes dating back more than 500
years, to compile a geographical mapping of family ties. We consider four family types7
(see figure 1):
- Absolute nuclear families are characterized by (i) non-cohabitation between parents
and adult children (children typically leave their family after their adolescence, form their
own family and become independent); (ii) lack of stringent inheritance rules; and (iii)
exogamous marriage relationships. These families nurture individualism. Every person is
independent, and has to rely mainly on his/her own individual eﬀort. This clearly implies
total independency of children from their parents, and viceversa. The choice of taking
7 In Todd (1990) and then in Duranton (2009), a finer geographical mapping with a classification at
regional level is provided. We will recur to this more detailed mapping at the end of session 5 when using
individual European Value Survey (EVS) data. For the other empirical analyses, we adopt the national
mapping, in which a country is classified according to the type that dominates in most regions.
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care of old-age parents becomes a subjective decision, rather than a generalized, codified
value. As parents have no obligation to support their adult children, kids may in turn
also choose whether to take care of old parents or not, and to what extent. Anglo-Saxon
countries, Holland and Denmark belong to this group;
- Egalitarian nuclear families feature (i) no cohabitation of parents and adult children,
(ii) exogamy, but (iii) the independence among generations is weaker than in the previous
case. In fact, parents are constrained by precise inheritance rules, based on the principle
of equality among siblings. This family welfare context favors the emergence of ideologies
of “universalism”, which recognize the value of equality, often in contrast to individualism.
Egalitarian families encourage the persistence of stronger relations between parents and
children. Moreover, to the extent that parents have a (moral or legal) obligation not to
favour a kid over the others in their inheritance decisions, all children become responsi-
ble for their old-age. Mediterranean countries (France, Italy, Spain, Greece), Portugal,
Romania, Poland, Latin America (apart from Cuba) and Ethiopia are in this group;
- Stem or authoritarian families are based on cohabitation of parents and adult children
(sons typically remain in their parents’ home and are subject to a vertical hierarchical
structure). Rules and social norms are transmitted across generations. However, parents
are largely independent from codified norms in their inheritance decisions, and the principle
of equality among children is typically not recognized. Germany, Austria, Sweden, Norway,
Czech Republic, Belgium, Luxembourg, Scotland, Ireland, Japan, Korea, Israel and Gitans
populations are characterized by this family structure;
- Communitarian families are based on cohabitation, and parents are bind to equal-
ity among siblings in the inheritance rules. These two features minimize individualism
and create strong family ties. This system was in place in Russia, Yugoslavia, Slovak,
Bulgaria, Finland, Hungary, Albania, Baltic republics, Centre of Italy, China, Vietnam,
Cuba, Indonesia and India.
Todd’s historical classification of family types is simple, but, at the same time, it
captures those aspects of the intergenerational family organization that are crucial to un-
derstand the diﬀerent incentives for the early design of the pension systems. In absolute
nuclear families, the principle of independence among family members dominates, and
adults thus have little responsibility for the well-being of their elderly parents. In the
(strong ties) communitarian and, to a lesser extent, in egalitarian nuclear and in author-
itarian families, children have instead a moral (or even legal) obligation to support their
parents in old age. To relate this historical classification to the current literature on family
culture, we compare it to the analysis of family ties in Alesina and Giuliano (2007). They
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use three individual questions from the World Value Survey: (i) How family is important
in life? the answer ranging from 1, "very important", to 4, "not at all important"; (ii)
Choose between A (corresponding to the score of 0): “Regardless of what the qualities and
faults of one’s parents are, one must always love and respect them” and B (score equals
1): “One does not have the duty to respect and love parents who have not earned it by
their behavior and attitudes”; (iii) Choose between A (score equals 0) “Parents’ duty is to
do their best for their children even at the expense of their own well-being” and B (score
equals 1) “Parents have a life of their own and should not be asked to sacrifice their own
well-being for the sake of their children”. To compare their current measures of family ties
based on these questions with Todd’s historical classification we estimate the following
simple model:
 = +1+2+3+4+
where  is the score attributed to the answer that individual  gives to each of the three
questions (respectively in column 1, 2 and 3),  is a set of individual controls (age,
age squared, income, education, political views) and a dummy variable controls for the
dominant level of family organization in the country of the respondent with absolute
nuclear families being the excluded category. Table 1 shows the correlation between Todd
(1983) and Alesina and Giuliano (2007) classifications. Todd’s classification plays no role
in explaining current responses on the importance of the family (column 1). However,
stronger (current) kid-to-parents links (see column 2) are associated with communitarian
and egalitarian nuclear families as compared to absolute nuclear families. Finally, column
3 describes the downward vertical ties from parents to kids, where authoritarian and
communitarian families are characterized by the prominent role of the parents. In line
with Todd’s historical classification, Alesina and Giuliano current survey data thus confirm
that stronger upward vertical ties are featured in communitarian and egalitarian nuclear
families.
3.2 The design of pension systems
In the western world, public pension systems were initially introduced between the end of
the XIX century and the end of World War II. Besides their financing method - PAYG,
FF or mixed- ever since their introduction, pension systems have largely diﬀered in their
design, generosity and coverage. The two polar cases are represented by the so-called
Bismarckian and the Beveridgean systems.8 A Bismarckian scheme covers all the workers,
8The names “Bismarckian” and “Beveridgean” date back respectively to the origin of the pension system
in Germany and to the system proposed few decades later by the Beveridge report in the United Kingdom.
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who have contributed to the system throughout their working life. It provides them with
a pension benefit that is strictly related to these contributions, and typically replaces a
large share of the workers’ previous wage. The replacement rates, i.e., the ratio of post-
retirement pension benefits to pre-retirement earnings, are thus approximately constant
across individuals of diﬀerent incomes, and the system entails no intragenerational redis-
tribution. In Beveridgean systems, contributions are largely proportional to earnings but
benefits are instead almost flat; thus, intragenerational redistribution is large. Beveridgean
systems have more universal coverage; they still base their financing on social security con-
tributions, but typically the pension benefit does not replace a large share of the worker’s
previous wage. As such, they mainly constitute a safety net that ensures enough retire-
ment income to low-income workers to cover their pensions wage, while providing a low
replacement of their previous wage to middle and high income workers.
To measure the design of the pension system, we thus consider the diﬀerence in the
replacement rates across individuals of diﬀerent income groups. Large diﬀerences in the
replacement rates — with high values for low-income individuals and viceversa — identify
pension systems that only act as a safety net, and should thus be associated with weak ties
families; and viceversa for constant replacement rates. As discussed in the next section,
we only have current measures of the replacement rates — namely around the year 2000.
Hence, for some countries, such as Germany, more than hundred years have passed since
the initial design of the pension systems. Fortunately, this design has been rather persis-
tent over time. In fact, while the size of pensions changes rapidly over years, depending
on demographic, economic and political circumstances (see Galasso, 2006), the redistrib-
utive design has proven to be much more stable. For instance, the United Kingdom is
still an example of a flat-rate pension system, while Germany, Italy and France have re-
mained earnings-related. For a sample of 20 OECD countries, Krieger and Traub (2008)
find no significant evidence of a change in the intragenerational redistribution in PAYG
systems. Some examples suggest that each scheme may actually have accentuated its
original design: Bismarckian systems have become more Bismarckian and analogously for
Beveridgean schemes. Italy, for instance, has implemented reforms which have strength-
ened the earning-related design, by shifting from a defined benefit formula for calculating
pensions to a notional defined contribution, which features a complete link between con-
tributions and benefits, and entails almost no intragenerational redistribution. On the
opposite, in the last few years the UK program has become even more redistributive: rich
In the first pension system, created in Germany by Bismarck in 1881, benefits were earning-related. The
Beveridge report, published in 1942 in the UK, introduced the alternative idea of a minimum system, i.e.,
a system with flat-rate benefits for qualified retirees.
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individuals may ‘contract out’ of the public system and enjoy a reduction of the contribu-
tion rate, while the State Second Pension (S2P) scheme introduced in 2002 reinforced the
safety net nature of the system.
3.3 Alternative determinants of pension design
Our model at section 2 highlights the existence of a transmission mechanism from pre-
existing family organizations to the original design of pension systems. Pension systems
were introduced to provide old-age support, which was previously supplied within the
family, and they were designed to mirror the same organization that was prevailing within
the family. Hence, where families characterized by weak ties among generations and strong
independence within the family, such as Todd’s absolute nuclear families, prevail, pension
systems feature only a basic safety net, and are not compelled to ensure a complete
provision of the elderly retirement income.
Besides family organizations, there may be alternative determinants of the main fea-
tures of the welfare state, and alternative mechanisms of transmission from pre-existing
conditions to the welfare state. The literature has focused in particular on the role of
religion, democratization, urbanization and legal origins. Flora (1983, 1987) argues that
the welfare state emerged under the process of secularization, i.e. the decline of religion
on human conduct, and the influence of Protestantism. When religious institutions lost
their dominance over society and in non-religious roles, and people reduced their religious
practices and beliefs, the state replaced the church in the “public” spheres. Protestantism
favored the development of the welfare state, in opposition to Catholicism, since the for-
mer encouraged the mobilization of lower income levels into mass politics and reduced the
power of the church into the public sphere, while the latter continued to be dominated by
the conflict between state and church.9 This contrast between Protestant and Catholic
countries helps also to explain the diﬀerences in characteristics of the welfare states (such
as the level of centralization and the degree of state intervention).10 Since the diﬀusion
9The relation between religion and in general socio-economic transformations was first identified by
Weber (1905), who linked the Protestant Reform to the modern capitalism. Guiso et al (2003) find that
religious beliefs, especially Christian religions, are associated with growth enhancing economic reforms.
See also McCleary and Barro (2006).
10Recently, van Kersbergen and Manow (2009) reconsidered the role of Protestantism, and showed that
Reformed Protestantism substantially delayed and restricted modern social policy, while the Lutheran state
churches positively contributed to the introduction of social protection programs. They also argue that
the interaction between religion and electoral rules produced diﬀerent political class coalitions sustaining
diﬀerent welfare regimes.
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of religion has proved very persistent, this original eﬀect may continue to shape current
welfare state systems.
Democratization may represent an alternative mechanism. According to the modern-
ization theory (Lipset, 1959), the introduction of the welfare state was due to the growing
needs for social policy, social and economic equality and security, created by the industri-
alization. In urban, richer societies, the demand for welfare state increases. Moreover, the
process of economic modernization promotes also the foundation and the consolidation
of democracies.11 In democracies, poor individuals take part in politics and, as a conse-
quence, policies favouring these individuals and promoting equality, such as redistributive
policies and welfare state may emerge (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2006; Boix, 2003). Thus,
democratic countries tend to have larger welfare states12.
Legal origins may also shape the pre-existing context in which pension systems were
introduced. According to La Porta et al. (1997) legal origins are a good proxy for financial
development. As argued by Pinotti (2009), more financial development implies less PAYG
social security and viceversa, thus establishing a causal relationship from pre-existing legal
origins and the size and features of the pension system (see also Perotti and Schwienbacher,
2007).
Finally, Persson and Tabellini (2004) suggest that old age spending may also de-
pend on electoral rules (majoritarian/proportional) and forms of government (presiden-
tial/parliamentary). In particular, presidential regimes tend to induce smaller public sec-
tors, while proportional elections lead to higher, but less targeted government spending,
and to larger budget deficits.
In the next section, we will test the validity of the transmission mechanism running
from family types to pension’s design against these alternative channels.
4 The Cross Country Analysis
4.1 Data and empirical specification
We aim to test the eﬀect of the pre-existing family organization, in particular its ver-
tical kids-to-parents transfer structure, on the initial design of pension systems around
the world. To characterize the diﬀerent family organizations, we consider Todd’s clas-
sification described at section 3.1 for a set of 85 countries, as shown at figure 1. We
11Clearly, the interaction between modernization and democratization is a two-way relation and it is
diﬃcult to disentangle the correct direction of causality, as economic development may favor democracy,
but also stable democracy may lead to economic growth.
12See Mulligan, Gill and Sala-i-Martin (2010) for a critical appraisal of this argument.
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use diﬀerent measures to identify the initial design of the pension system. Since Bismar-
ckian systems provided high replacement rates that are constant across income groups,
while in Beveridgean systems the replacement rates vary widely across income, we identify
the design of the pension scheme with the ratio between replacement rates (the ratio of
post-retirement pension benefits to pre-retirement earnings) at diﬀerent levels of income.
Higher ratios identify a safety net scheme that provides high replacements to low-income
individuals, and low to the others. We also use a direct measure of the current replacement
rate for an individual with the average wage in the economy. Higher replacements are as-
sociated with more generous pension for the retiree, and thus indicate that the system
provides more than just a safety net. Pension coverage, defined as the share of population
between 15 and 64 years old that is covered by the pension system, captures the diﬀusion
of the system among the population. System providing only a safety net typically feature
high coverage, and yet are associated with lower spending. Pension expenditure as a per-
centage of GDP is also considered as a dependent variable. For these pension variables,
we consider the available data around the year 2000. While the redistributive design of
the pension systems has been rather stable since their introduction, and thus these recent
values may be a good proxy for the initial design, current coverage and pension spending
is largely determined by current demographic, economic and political processes.
We estimate a simple cross country model:
 = + 1 + 2 + 3 +
4 + 5 + 6 + 7 + 
where  is our dependent variable measuring the redistributive design of the pension
scheme (or the size of pension) in country ;  is a dummy variable
equal to 1 if country  features a communitarian family and 0 otherwise; 
is a dummy variable equal to 1 if country  has an authoritarian family and 0 otherwise;
 is a dummy variable equal to 1 if country  has an egalitarian nuclear
family and 0 otherwise;  and  are geographical dummy variables
equal to 1 if country  belongs respectively to OECD, Latin America and Africa and 0
otherwise;  is a set of control variables, which include alternative legal, cultural, politi-
cal, economic and demographic determinants that could have aﬀected the design and the
size of the system, and  is the error term. The absolute nuclear family type is thus the
omitted one and our reference family type.
For our dependent variables  we use diﬀerent measures of design and size of the
pensions: (i) the ratio between the replacement rates of a worker earning one-half of the
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average income and the one of a worker earning exactly the average income (Ratio low);
(ii) the ratio between the replacement rate of a worker earning the 75% of the average
income and the one of a worker earning 150% of the average income (Ratio medium); (iii)
the replacement rate of a worker earning the average income (Replace); (iv) the pension
coverage, i.e. the share of population between 15 and 64 years old that is covered by the
pension system, and (v) the pension spending as a percentage of GDP.
Figures 2 and 3 show the distribution of our main measures of pension design, (ratio
low) and (ratio medium) around the world, suggesting that they vary widely across (and
within) geographic areas.
Due to the small number of observations, we run diﬀerent sets of regressions includ-
ing one of the following control variables, , at a time: legal origins, religion, level of
urbanization, level of democracy, GDP and the share of elderly.
Our unit of analysis is the country, since pension design varies at country level but is
homogeneous within country. Furthermore, since this design displays a strong time persis-
tence and we have historical data on family types, we abstract from the time component
and concentrate on a cross-country analysis. Data availability limits the number of obser-
vations to 55 when we use the replacement rates (ratio low) and to 78 when we measure
the size of pension. Data sources are described in the appendix. Summary statistics are
at table 2.
4.2 Results
Table 3 presents the baseline specification. We regress our measures of the design and size
of pensions on the three types of pre-existing family structures and on the geographical
dummies. Communitarian and egalitarian nuclear families are less redistributive than
absolute nuclear ones according to our two measures of the replacement ratio. Using our
most preferred measure13 (ratio medium), also authoritarian families are less redistributive
than absolute nuclear. This result is in line with the idea that absolute nuclear families
feature weak and independent relations between parents and children, which lead to the
design of a pension system that resembles a safety net. In families that prize independence,
and do not tie the parents’ hands to equal inheritance rules, children do not perceive the
provision of old-age support to their parents as an obligation, unless perhaps they are in
strong need of help. This family organization translates into pension design: individuals
13This measure considers the ratio of the replacement rates at 75% and 150% of the average wage, and
thus provides a better picture of the pension design than our other measure that considers the replacement
rate of very low income individuals (at 50% of the average wage).
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only expect to receive a safety net from the state. Where instead children took good
care of their elderly parents, the state has to provide a suﬃcient pension to replace the
individual previous wage income. This idea is supported by our results. The level of the
replacement rate is positively related to the strength of the family ties. All other family
types enjoy a higher replacement than countries with absolute nuclear families, indicating
that they provide more than just a safety net.
When we turn to the size of pension, as expected, absolute nuclear families are asso-
ciated with a higher coverage, while current pension spending is instead unrelated to the
types of families.
We now enrich our baseline scenario by introducing additional variables to control for
alternative channels that may explain the original design of pension systems, or which may
influence both pension design and family values. We first introduce legal origins, which,
following La Porta et al. (1997) are classified as Anglo-Saxon, Socialist, Germany and
French. Figure 4 shows the geographical distribution of these indicators. By comparing
figures 1 and 4, we do not see a clear association between family types and legal origins,
suggesting that family ties may be capturing some inherent value diﬀerent from what is
expressed by the origin of the legal system. This is confirmed in table 4, where we add
the four dummy variables referring to legal origins in our baseline specification. When
compared to communitarian and egalitarian nuclear families, absolute nuclear families
remain associated with more Beveridgean schemes and larger coverage. Communitarian
families have also a higher replacement rate. Interestingly, Anglo-Saxon legal origins are
associated with less coverage and lower pension spending,14 but do not seem to aﬀect the
design.
We then turn to religion, which has also been considered a crucial and persistent
determinant of economic and social outcomes (see section 3.3). We want to control whether
religion, rather than the principles underlying family types, is the real driver of the diﬀerent
pension design across countries. The diﬀusion of the main religions, Catholic, Orthodox,
Protestant, Islamic, around the world in 1900 is not directly associated with the design
of pensions. Redistributive pensions are present in many Protestant countries, but also
in the catholic Argentina and Ireland. In table 5, we control for the relative share of
these four religions in the diﬀerent countries in 1900 (i.e., in the period around or before
the introduction of the pension systems). Again, we find that absolute nuclear family
are associated with more redistributive pension schemes than other types of families.
14This result is in line with the idea that private pensions may substitute for public pensions when
financial markets are well developed, which is in turn associated with Anglo-Saxon legal origins.
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Religion seems to have no eﬀect on pensions design,15 but to be associated with low pension
expenditure and low coverage, in countries with a large share of Muslims. Similarly, in
table 6, a Herfindal index of religious homogeneity is not significantly associated with the
design, while the types of family remain crucial.
In table 7, we include a measure of the level of urbanization of the country at the
beginning of the XX century. While this variable turns out to be associated with the size
of the pension systems in the obvious direction (more urbanization implies more pensions),
it is not significant to explain the design. The types of family remain instead significant.
In table 8, we introduce an indicator of the political environment in the diﬀerent
countries in 1900. Do the design of system or their size depend on whether countries
were more democratic at the time of the introduction of the system? A higher level of
democratization, as captured by the Polity2 indicator16 has no impact on the design of
pensions; as usual, having an absolute nuclear family organization implies a significantly
diﬀerent design than any other family type, namely a more redistributive scheme.
In table 9, we control for current economic and demographic variables, that is, the
level of GDP and the share of elderly in the population. Richer countries have higher
coverage, while more elderly are associated with both higher coverage and more pension
spending.17 Current income and aging are however not correlated with pension design,
and the type of family remains significant in all specifications in the usual way.
Finally, in table 10, we control for electoral rules and forms of government. As expected,
countries with majoritarian systems have lower coverage and pension spending, as well as
lower replacement rates than countries with proportional systems. However, having a
majoritarian or a proportional electoral rule has no impact on the redistributive design of
pensions, while family types continue to show the usual eﬀect. The form of government,
presidential versus parliamentary, turns out to play no role.
15Unfortunately, the CIA factbook reports observations only for 49 of the countries for which we have
pension data. The coeﬃcient of the family types are less precisely estimated, but point estimates are in
line with the estimates in the previous tables.
16For details, see the appendix.
17There is a large literature on the link between aging and the size of social security (see Galasso and
Profeta, 2004, Disney, 2007).
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5 The Individual Data Analysis
5.1 Data and empirical specification
We now turn to individual data to test whether individuals’ preferences on the current
design of pension system are aﬀected by their family types. We provide two types of
evidence.
In the first analysis, we consider individual responses to four questions on the role of the
government in providing support to the elderly, contained in diﬀerent waves of the General
Social Survey (GSS) from 1972 to 2008. Following an established literature (see Fernández
and Fogli, 2006, 2009, and Alesina and Giuliano, 2007, among many others), we associate
to each person the family type of his/her family’s country of origin. This information is
available since each individual in the GSS is asked to provide his/her birthplace and the
country of origin of his/her forbearers — namely to answer to the following question: "From
what countries or part of the world did your ancestors come?". We restrict our analysis
to the available countries18 for which Todd’s classification in family types is available.
We concentrate on four questions, which unable us to identify the individual preferences
for government responsibility in social issue, and in particular in old age security. First,
individuals are asked the following: "We are faced with many problems in this country,
none of which can be solved easily or inexpensively. I’m going to name some of these
problems, and for each one I’d like you to tell me whether you think we’re spending too
much money on it, too little money, or about the right amount. Are we spending too much,
too little, or about the right amount on social security?" (see social security spending in
column 1, table 11, where 1 identifies "too little" and 3 is for "too much"). This question
was available in several waves (1983-87, 1987, 1988-91, 1993-96, 1998, 2000, 2002, 2004,
2006, 2008). Second, "On these cards are some opinions about the government and the
economy. I’d like you to tell me whether you strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat
disagree or strongly disagree with the following: It is the responsibility of government to
meet everyone’s needs, even in case of sickness, poverty, unemployment, and old age." (see
government responsibility in column 2, table 11, where 1 means "strongly agree" and 4
"strongly disagree"). This question was only available in the 1983-87 wave. Third, "On
18The available answers are Africa, Austria, Canada, China, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, England and
Wales, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Netherlands, Norway,
Philippines, Poland, Puerto Rico, Russia (USSR), Scotland, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, West Indies,
Other to be specified, American Indian, India, Portugal, Lithuania, Yugoslavia, Romania, Belgium, Arabic,
Other Spanish, Other Asian, Other European, America. We drop the observations with answers such as
Africa, Other Spanish, Other Asian, Other European for which we are unable to match a family type.
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the whole, do you think it should or should not be the government’s responsibility to
provide a decent standard of living for the old?" (see old age spending in column 3, table
11, where 1 is for "it definitely should be" and 4 is for "it definitely should not be").
This question was available for the following waves: 1983-87, 1988-91, 1993-96, 2002, 2006.
Forth, "Listed below are various areas of government spending. Please indicate whether
you would like to see more or less government spending in retirement benefits. Remember
that if you say "much more," it might require a tax increase to pay for it" (see retirement
benefit spending in column 4, table 11, where 1 means "you want to spend much more"
and 5 is that "you want to spend much less") This question was available for the following
waves: 1983-87, 1988-91, 1993-96, 1998, 2006.
For these four questions, we run the following OLS regression:
 = +1+2+3+4+
where  is our dependent variable measuring the response to the above questions by an
individual  whose ancestors were coming from country ; the dummy refers to the family
type in the country of origin of the respondent, and  is a set of individual controls, such
as age, income, level of education and political views, and  is the error term. Standard
errors are clustered at country level. As before, the absolute nuclear family type is the
omitted one and our reference family type.
In the second analysis with individual data, we exploit the local (within-country)
variation in family ties provided by Todd (1990) to test whether individuals from diﬀerent
family types, but facing the same pension system, have diﬀerent perceptions on pension
policies. In particular, we consider individual responses to a question about pension
responsibility included in the 1999 wave of the European Value Survey (EVS), which ranges
from "1 - each individual should be responsible for arranging his or her own pension"
to "10 - the state should be responsible for everyone’s pension". According to Todd
(1990), among European countries, diﬀerent family types coexisted in Finland, France,
Italy, Portugal, Spain and the UK. However, among these countries, the EVS question on
pension responsibility was only asked in Finland, where communitarian was the dominant
family, which coexisted with authoritarian, Portugal, with egalitarian nuclear as dominant
and authoritarian in the north of the country, and in the UK, with absolute nuclear being
dominant in England and authoritarian in Scotland and other regions.
For each of these three countries, we run the following OLS regression:
 = + 1 + 2 + 
where  is our dependent variable measuring the response to the above question by
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an individual  living in region ; the dummy Authoritarian refers to the non-dominant
family type, which is authoritarian in all countries, and  is a set of individual controls,
such as age, income, level of education and political views, and  is the error term.
Notice that the omitted variable is the dominant family type, and diﬀers by country being
communitarian in Finland, egalitarian nuclear in Portugal, and absolute nuclear in the
UK.
5.2 Results
Consider first the responses to four questions on the role of the government in providing
support to the elderly from the 1972-2008 General Social Survey (GSS). Table 11 presents
the results of the regression of these individual responses on family type in the respondent’s
country of origin, and on individual characteristics. US respondents with an egalitarian
nuclear family background (i.e., with ancestors coming from countries featuring egalitarian
nuclear families) find current US spending in social security to be too low, if compared to
people with an absolute nuclear background. Other family backgrounds do not seem to
matter. Individual from strong ties families are only weakly more favorable to government
responsibility for a variety of individual needs (poverty, sickness, unemployment as well
as old age) than people from absolute nuclear families. However, having a strong family
background (i.e., ancestors coming from communitarian, egalitarian nuclear and, to a lesser
extent, authoritarian countries) matters for explaining individual support19 for (i) more
government involvement in providing a decent standard of living to the elderly (column
3) and (ii) more government spending in retirement benefits (column 4).
Hence, even when individuals face the same economic and institutional environment,
i.e., the same welfare state, after controlling for individual characteristics (such as age,
income, education and political orientation), the family culture inherited from the ances-
tors seems to matter in shaping individual preferences especially when it comes to old age
(pension) policies.
Our second analysis on individual date exploits the local diﬀerence in family types in
Finland, Portugal and the UK. Table 12 reports our regression results. In the UK (column
1), after controlling for individual characteristics, respondents in the regions characterized
by an authoritarian family structure (Scotland, Wales, north west and west midlands) are
significantly more in favor of state intervention than the individuals living in the remaining
regions (England and others), which feature the dominant, weak ties family, i.e., absolute
nuclear. In Portugal (column 2), the dominant family structure is egalitarian nuclear, but
19Multilogit analyses provide similar results.
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in the north region authoritarian families are more common. Controlling for individual
characteristics, no significant diﬀerence emerges between respondents in these two areas.
A similar result emerges in Finland, where the dominant family is communitarian, but
authoritarian families are relevant in some areas (Pohjanhaa, Uusimaa, and Varsinais-
Suomi). Diﬀerences in family background have no eﬀect on the respondents’ preferences
for individual vs. state intervention in old age pensions (column 3).
Evidence obtained using individual data from EVS thus confirm the results of the
previous analyses. Even when individuals enjoy the same pension system, after controlling
for their individual features, people from weak ties family regions are more likely to prefer
individual responsibility for old age pension over state intervention. In this case, the
results for the UK suggest that the crucial diﬀerence rests in the distance between the
independent, absolute nuclear family and the other stronger families, while diﬀerences
within strong ties families — authoritarian vs. communitarian in Finland, and egalitarian
nuclear vs. authoritarian in Portugal — are less relevant.
6 Conclusions
We have tried to identified the types of family relationships as the ultimate cause of the
design of pension systems. Why family? According to Todd (1983), family ties do not
depend on climate conditions, geological features, or economic environment. The system
of latent values embedded in the family seems to have no link with religion or language.
There is nothing pre-determined to the family relationships. In a world, behind the family
there is only the “hazard”.
Our empirical analysis shows that family organization was a primal determinant of the
pension systems’ design since their introduction. Legal origin and religion, which have
extensively been suggested to determine other socioeconomic outcomes, had instead no
role. Similarly, other features of the political, demographic and economic context in which
pensions were introduced, such as the level of urbanization or democratization of the
country at that time, or current variables such as current GDP and the share of elderly in
the population, have also little power to explain the design of pensions. Interestingly, some
of these variables turn out to be related to current features, such as the size or the coverage
of the pensions, but not the design. A family organization featuring high independence
among individuals, as in absolute nuclear families, is associated with the emergence of
a Beveridgean pension system with flat benefit formulas and more redistribution across
income levels. Stronger family types, in particular communitarian and egalitarian nuclear,
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match with a Bismarckian (generous) pension schemes. Data on the individual responses to
questions on the role of the government in providing support to the elderly provide a similar
picture. Using current GSS data, we found that individuals whose ancestors came to the
US from countries featuring communitarian or egalitarian nuclear families prefer to rely
on the government as a provider of old age security through generous retirement benefits.
Moreover, we use individual data from a EVS question on the role of the state in pension
policy, to exploit the within-country variation in Todd (1990) classification in family types.
Our analysis of the UK suggests that individuals who live in regions featuring weak ties
families support individual responsibility for old age pension over state intervention. No
diﬀerence instead emerge when comparing individuals from diﬀerent regions all featuring
strong ties families, such as authoritarian vs. communitarian in Finland, and egalitarian
nuclear vs. authoritarian in Portugal.
Besides having a strong historical component, our analysis may shed some light on
the feasibility of today’s pension reforms. Individuals’ behavior, as shaped by cultural
or institutional elements influences the policy-makers’ decision on which institution (e.g.,
pension systems) to choose, how to design it (Bismarckian earnings-related versus Bev-
eridgean flat-rate) and how to implement the policy. This is a promising direction for
future research.
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Technical Appendix
.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Adults maximize with respect to   the following indirect utility function
ln [ (1−  )− ]+ ln £max© + +1ª¤+ (1− ) ln [max { +1}] if   
(8)
ln
£ (1−  )−  − ¡1 + ¢ ( − −1 − )¤+
+ ln £max© + +1ª¤+  (1− ) ln [max { +1}]    (9)
where  = (1− )  .
Notice that individuals expect their decisions over   to have no eﬀect on  +1, that
is, they take  +1 and +1 as given.
For   , we clearly have   = 0, since a positive tax rate would only represent
a cost for the adults.
For   , instead, we have the following first order condition:  ( ) = − +¡
1 + ¢ (1− ) . Hence, individuals voting decision will depend on their income:
  =
( 
1−
 such that  = (1− )   =  for  
¡
1 + ¢ (1− ) 
0 for   ¡1 + ¢ (1− ) 
In the old regime,  = 0, by assumption 1, we have that   (1− ) , and thus a
majority of voters prefer  = 0.
In the new regime,  = , high income voters, with   (1 + ) (1− )  = e, prefer
 = 0, while for the others (  e) their preferred tax rate is increasing in income. We
can thus re-order the individuals’ preferences according to their income to have that the
median voter, characterized by  , is such that  () −  (e) +  ( ) + 12, with
 () = 1. The equilibrium tax rate is thus  = 1−  .
.2 Proof of proposition 2
Consider first a Bismarckian pension system,  = (1− )  . Adults maximize the
indirect utility function at eq. 8. Hence, for   , we have   = 0, while for
   the first order condition becomes:  ( ) = −1 + ¡1 + ¢ (1− ). Hence, for
  , in the old regime,  = 0, all voters oppose pensions,  = 0; in the new regime,
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 =   0, according to assumption 2, all voters support a pension system that takes care
of the consumption of the elderly, and hence  = (1− ), so that  = (1− )  = .
Given the results in proposition 1, we can now turn to comparing the two systems.
In the old regime, no pension system is supported ( = 0), regardless of the design.
In the new regime, for  = 0, individuals with low income,  ≤  , prefer
the Beveridgean system that provides at least the family consumption to their parents,
 =  ≥  = , at a lower cost, since  = 1−    = 1− ,
as   . For individuals with higher income (   ), the Beveridgean pension
transfer is not suﬃcient to cover their parents family consumption level,  =  
. Since they have to top-up the pension benefits with family transfers, the total cost
of the Beveridgean system becomes
  + (1 + )
¡ −  ¢ = 1−    + (1 + )  ( −  ) .
This cost is smaller than the cost of the Bismarckian system,  = 1− , and thus
individuals support a Beveridgean system if   +− = b, and they prefer a
Bismarckian system for  ≥ b. Hence, for  ≥ b a Bismarckian system emerges with
 =  , and a Beveridgean with  =  for   b.
Once a system has been introduced for  = 0 ∀, it will continue to be supported
if  = 0 ∀ also in the future. A suﬃcient condition for this to occur is that  = 0
∀. We now consider the saving decisions. These decisions have a strategic component,
as adults realize that, should they arrive in old age with no private wealth, they would
receive support from their family. By comparing the lifetime utility associated with no
savings,
0 =  ( = 0) = ln [ (1−  )] +  ln []
with the utility associated with the optimal savings
 =  (∗ ) = ln [ (1−  )− ] +  ln
£¤+  (1− ) ln []
where ∗ = argmax () =  (1−  ) (1 + ), we have that
(i) in a Bismarckian system, i.e., for   =  = 1− , 0   and thus individuals
do not save if  ≥ 
(1+)(1+ 1)+(1−)
;
(ii) in a Beveridgean system, i.e., for   =  = 1−  , 0   and thus individ-
uals do not save if  ≥ 
(1+)(1+ 1)+ (1−)
.
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.3 Proof of proposition 3
Adults maximize with respect to   the following indirect utility function
ln [ (1−  )− ]+ ln £max© + +1ª¤+ (1− ) ln [max { +1}] if   
(10)
ln
£ (1−  )−  − ¡1 + ¢ ( − −1 + )¤+
+ ln £max© + +1ª¤+  (1− ) ln [max { +1}] if    (11)
where  = (1− )   in the Beveridgean system and  = (1− )   in the Bismar-
ckian system.
Regardless of the design of the pension system, for   , we have   = 0.
Consider that   .
In the Bismarckian system, we have the following first order condition:  ( ) = −1 +¡
1 + ¢ (1− ). Hence, in the old regime,  = 0, all voters oppose pensions,  = 0; while
in the new regime,  =   0, by assumption 2, all voters support their most preferred
tax rate   = (1−) such that  = (1− )  = . This tax rate is decreasing in income
and the median voter theorem applies.
In the Beveridgean system, we have the following first order condition:  ( ) = −+¡
1 + ¢ (1− ) , and thus individuals voting decision will depend on their income:
  =
( 
1− such that  = (1− )   =  for  
¡
1 + ¢ (1− ) 
0 for   ¡1 + ¢ (1− ) 
In the old regime,  = 0, by assumption 1, we have that   (1− ) , and thus a
majority of voters prefer  = 0.
In the new regime,  = , by assumption 2, with   (1 + ) (1− ) , and thus the
median voter supports  = 1− .
Comparing the two systems in the new regime, for  = 0, it is easy to see that
individuals with above median income,    , will prefer a Beveridgean system, since
both systems cover the elderly parents subsistence consumption level,  =  ≥
 = , but the Beveridgean system is less costly, since  = 1−   = 1− 
with   . Below median income individuals,    , have to top-up the pension
benefits with private transfers, in the Bismarckian system, so its cost to the adults is
  + (1 + )
¡ −  ¢ = 1−   + (1 + ) 
µ
1− 
¶
.
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This is clearly larger than the cost of a Beveridgean system,   = 1− for low
income adults with    . Hence, all individuals support a Beveridgean system when
 = 0.
Once a Beveridgean system has been introduced for  = 0 ∀, it will continue to
be supported if  = 0 for a majority of the adults also in the future. A suﬃcient
condition for this to occur is that  = 0 ∀. We now consider the saving decisions. These
decisions have a strategic component, as adults realize that, should they arrive in old age
with no private wealth, they would receive support from their family. By comparing the
lifetime utility associated with no savings,
0 =  ( = 0) = ln [ (1−  )] +  ln []
with the utility associated with the optimal savings
 =  (∗ ) = ln [ (1−  )− ] +  ln
£¤+  (1− ) ln []
where ∗ = argmax (), we have that in a Beveridgean system, i.e., for   =  =

1− , 0   and thus ∗  0 for    = (1+)
(1+ 1)
(1− 1−)
.
Hence, if   , ∗ = 0 for a majority of the adults, and a Beveridgean system is
always supported. If    , and hence ∗  0 for a majority of the adults, when  = ,
the system is not supported and  = 0.
A Data appendix
We here describe the variables used in the empirical analysis and their sources.
• Replacement rates of the pension system at 50%, 75%, 100% and 150% of average
labor income are built on Whitehouse (2007) “Pension Panorama” The World Bank
and OECD (2009) “Pension at a Glance. Special Edition: Asia/Pacific. From these
data we calculate Ratio low: the ratio between the replacement rate of a worker
earning one-half of the average income and the one of a worker earning exactly
the average income; Ratio medium: the ratio between the replacement rate of a
worker earning the 75% of the average income and the one of a worker earning
150% of the average income; and replace: the replacement rate of a worker earning
the average income. Data on ratio medium are available for the following coun-
tries: Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahrain, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada,
Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Dominican Re-
public, Egypt, El Salvador, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary
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, Iran, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Latvia, Libya, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Mex-
ico, Morocco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Slovak
Republic, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Tunisia, Turkey, United Kingdom, United
States, Uruguay, Yemen. Data on replace and ration low include also China, India,
Indonesia, Pakistan, Vietnam.
• Coverage is the share of population between 15 and 64 years old that is covered by
the pension system. It is constructed as the mean of diﬀerent observations over time.
Source: World Bank (2007). HDNSP pension database. With respect to the previ-
ous variable, the sample includes some additional countries, Afghanistan, Albania,
Bangladesh, Bolivia, Brazil, Dominica, Ecuador, Jamaica, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan,
Lebanon, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Syria, Venezuela, Yugoslavia, but excludes Bulgaria,
Dominican Republic, New Zealand.
• Pension spending: this variable indicates how much pensions count as a share of
GDP. The data were collected in diﬀerent time periods, in particular between 1991
and 2006. However most of them come from a period around the 2000. Source:
World Bank (2007), HDNSP pension database. The sample includes the same coun-
tries as coverage 1564 with the addition of Azerbaijan, Belize, Cuba, Dominican
Republic, Ethiopia, Guatemala, Honduras, Israel, Kuwait, New Zealand, Panama,
Russia, Slovenia, Trinidad & Tobago, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and the exclusion
of Bahrain, Dominica, India, Indonesia, Kazakhstan, South Korea.
• Family types variables:
- AbsoluteEgal: this variable is equal to one if the family is absolute nuclear and
zero otherwise. Source: Todd (1983).
- Communitarian: this variable is equal to one if the family is communitarian and
zero otherwise. Source: Todd (1983).
- Authoritarian: this variable is equal to zero if there are authoritarian families and
zero otherwise. Source: Todd (1983).
- Egalit Nuclear: this variable is equal to zero if there are egalitarian nuclear families
and zero otherwise. Source: Todd (1983).
• Legal origins variables: the origin of the legal system in a country is indicated by a set
of dummy variables Legal Eng, Legal Socialist, Legal German, Legal French. Each
dummy is equal to one if the country has the particular legal origin of interest and
35
zero otherwise. In general we do not have overlapping among the dummies. More
precisely: Legal Eng refers to an Anglo-Saxon legal origin; Legal Socialist refers to
a socialist legal origin; Legal German to a Germany legal origin; Legal French to a
French legal origin. Source: La Porta et al. (1998).
• Religion variables:
- Catholic 1900, Orthodox 1900, Protestant 1900, Muslim 1900 contain the percent-
age in 1900 over the entire population of Catholic, Orthodox, Protestant and Muslin
people respectively. Source: CIA factbook.
- Herfrel1900: this variable is a proxy for the level of religious heterogeneity is
a country in 1900. It has been constructed computing the Hirschman-Herfindahl
index using the religion data. In particular we have data on the following religions:
catholic, protestant, orthodox, Muslim, Jewish, Buddhism, East Religions;
• Urban: this variable contains the share of population living in an urban area in the
early XX century. Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators (WDI).
• Polity2_1900: This data presents an evaluation of the political situation in the diﬀer-
ent countries. The ranking goes from -10 (hereditary monarchy) to +10 (consolidated
democracy). The score is computed by subtracting the AUTOC score from the DE-
MOC score, where these indicators are derived from coding of the competitiveness
of political participation, the openness and competitiveness of executive recruitment
and constraints on the chief executive using diﬀerent weights. Source: Center of Sys-
temic peace, the Policy IV Project (http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm).
Data refers to the year 1900.
• Ln GPDpc: logarithm of the GDP per capita in the 2000. Source: World Bank,
World Development Indicators
• Share of Elderly: share of people older than 65 years old over the entire population
in 2000. Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators
• Electoral Rules: the dummy variable Majoritarian takes value one if the country has
a majoritarian system and zero otherwise (proportional or mixed). Source: Persson
and Tabellini (2004)
• Form of Government: the dummy variable Presidential takes value one if the country
has a presidential regime and zero otherwise (parliamentary). Source: Persson and
Tabellini (2004)
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• Geographic dummy variables:
- Oecd: dummy variable equal to one if the country of interest is an OECD country
and zero otherwise;
- Laam: dummy variable that is equal to one if the country of interest is a Latin
America country and zero otherwise;
- Africa: dummy variable that is equal to one if the country of interest is an African
country and zero otherwise;
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Table 1: Family ties and family types 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Family  
importance 
Parental  
Respect 
Parental  
Responsibility 
    
age -0.007*** -0.001 -0.004*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Age squared 7.74e-05*** -2.91e-06 2.74e-05*** 
 (1.24e-05) (1.06e-05) (1.00e-05) 
Income -0.009*** 0.006*** 0.0008 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) 
Education 0.004 0.009*** 0.015*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) 
Political orientation 0.003 0.015*** 0.008** 
 (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) 
Communitarian  0.039 -0.135** 0.086*** 
 (0.040) (0.065) (0.031) 
Autoritarian  0.019 0.012 0.163*** 
 (0.033) (0.088) (0.049) 
Egalit Nuclear  0.018 -0.142** 0.014 
 (0.035) (0.065) (0.025) 
Constant 1.259*** 0.219*** 0.180*** 
 (0.041) (0.064) (0.039) 
    
Observations 101169 94631 89011 
R-squared 0.007 0.037 0.028 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2: Summary statistics 
Variable  Obs  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max 
           
Ratio Low   55  1.231257  .304288  .8593314  2 
Ratio Medium  50  1.165635  .2707104  .8409091  2 
Replacement  55  71.79455  23.16048  16.2  125.4 
Coverage  68  39.44265  24.83791  2.1  95.5 
Pension Spending  78  6.070513  4.554607  0  15 
           
Communitarian  78  .4358974          .4990834  0  1 
Autoritarian   78   .1282051      .336482  0  1 
Egalitarian nuclear  78  .3461538      .4788222  0  1 
Absolut nuclear   78  .0897436       .287664  0  1 
           
Legal English  78  1410256      .3503008   0  1 
Legal Socialist  78   .2564103      .4394772  0  1 
Legal French  78   .5128205       .5128205      0  1 
Legal German  78  .0384615      .1935524  0  1 
Catholic in 1900  49  .4662041  .4243819  0  1 
Protestant in 1900  49  .2058776  .3351906  0  .992 
Orthodox in 1900  49  .0683224  .1434626  0  .839 
Muslisms 1900  49  .189102  .3724387  0  .997 
Herfindrel Index in 1900  49  .7779092  .1950197  .338706  1 
Urban  73  63921.92      19240.71  15400  97000 
polity2 in 1900   45  ‐.2666667      6.213621         ‐10  10 
Elderly population in 2005  76  9.67852  5.369072  1.768561  19.9696 
Ln GDP per capita  75  8.15069      1.407489     4.706893  10.47798 
Majoritarian  52  .2115385  .4123837  0  1 
Presidential  52  .3846154  .4912508  0  1 
 
 
   
Table 3: Baseline specification 
 RATIO RATIO REPLACE COVERAGE PENSION  
VARIABLES LOW MEDIUM   SPENDING 
      
Communitarian -0.47*** -0.51*** 29.54*** -31.96*** 0.74 
 (0.15) (0.12) (10.45) (8.56) (2.26) 
Autoritarian -0.21 -0.23* 12.81 -1.22 1.81 
 (0.14) (0.13) (8.51) (3.45) (1.44) 
Egalit Nuclear -0.35** -0.46*** 28.50*** -8.20*** 2.37 
 (0.16) (0.11) (7.28) (2.60) (1.84) 
oecd -0.05 -0.05 10.17 13.18* 4.17** 
 (0.09) (0.05) (9.13) (7.78) (2.04) 
laam 0.20 0.17 -8.53 -27.69*** -3.11 
 (0.17) (0.11) (12.97) (7.11) (3.14) 
africa -0.10** -0.00 14.89 -1.35 -2.71** 
 (0.04) (0.03) (10.05) (5.78) (1.08) 
Constant 1.56*** 1.52*** 44.94*** 58.53*** 4.45* 
 (0.15) (0.12) (10.53) (7.82) (2.31) 
      
Observations 55 50 55 68 78 
R-squared 0.314 0.378 0.185 0.661 0.360 
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4: Legal Origin 
 RATIO RATIO REPLACE COVERAGE PENSION  
VARIABLES LOW MEDIUM   SPENDING 
      
Communitarian  -0.35* -0.38** 17.43* -36.96*** -3.09 
 (0.18) (0.16) (10.12) (7.91) (2.13) 
Autoritarian  -0.01 -0.03 3.13 -7.16 -1.03 
 (0.16) (0.15) (9.23) (8.07) (1.52) 
Egalit Nuclear  -0.14 -0.28* 9.86 -10.13* 0.33 
 (0.19) (0.16) (11.44) (5.27) (1.75) 
Legal Eng 0.08 0.19 -10.69 -16.87** -5.18*** 
 (0.16) (0.16) (8.11) (7.91) (1.38) 
Legal Socialist -0.19 0.024 -0.89 7.02 1.66 
 (0.14) (0.14) (9.83) (10.45) (1.91) 
Legal German -0.33* -0.21 4.56 -8.34 0.61 
 (0.17) (0.16) (10.84) (6.57) (1.80) 
Legal Franch -0.19 -0.06 14.87 -14.46 -2.50** 
 (0.12) (0.12) (10.38) (8.99) (1.24) 
Constant 1.58*** 1.39*** 55.74*** 67.09*** 8.31** 
 (0.24) (0.21) (16.10) (10.54) (3.16) 
Regional Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 55 50 55 68 78 
R-squared 0.410 0.465 0.274 0.759 0.529 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5: Religion 
 RATIO RATIO REPLACE COVERAGE PENSION 
VARIABLES LOW MEDIUM   SPENDING
      
Communitarian  -0.44*** -0.52*** 21.36** -7.96* 1.49 
 (0.15) (0.14) (9.76) (4.63) (1.68) 
Autoritarian  -0.23 -0.27* 13.34 1.29 2.48 
 (0.17) (0.16) (8.38) (3.11) (1.54) 
Egalit Nuclear  -0.30 -0.51*** 25.55** -4.18 6.07*** 
 (0.18) (0.15) (10.06) (4.16) (1.81) 
Catholic 1900 -0.08 -0.00 4.545 -0.02 -3.22 
 (0.18) (0.14) (19.39) (9.67) (5.29) 
protestant1900 -0.03 -0.08 3.023 7.06 -0.56 
 (0.17) (0.13) (14.39) (7.98) (4.87) 
Orthodox 1900 -0.35 -0.01 13.50 5.18 -4.11 
 (0.25) (0.20) (23.51) (11.43) (5.75) 
Muslim 1900 -0.08 -0.05 31.85 -38.94*** -9.19* 
 (0.17) (0.13) (20.44) (10.11) (5.18) 
Constant 1.60*** 1.57*** 45.09*** 60.75*** 9.57* 
 (0.20) (0.16) (16.55) (8.26) (5.19) 
Regional Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 49 49 49 47 47 
R-squared 0.355 0.379 0.332 0.862 0.637 
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6: Religious Homogeneity  
 RATIO RATIO REPLACE COVERAGE PENSION  
VARIABLES LOW MEDIUM   SPENDING
      
Communitarian  -0.58*** -0.54*** 34.76*** -20.71* -0.715 
 (0.14) (0.12) (10.75) (11.71) (2.38) 
Autoritarian  -0.31** -0.26* 13.42 2.79 3.12 
 (0.14) (0.14) (9.662) (6.13) (2.07) 
Egalit Nuclear  -0.47*** -0.49*** 29.09*** -3.58 5.55*** 
 (0.15) (0.11) (9.57) (6.28) (1.98) 
herfrel1900 0.37* 0.10 -3.67 -17.92 -4.88 
 (0.18) (0.15) (20.11) (14.03) (3.65) 
Constant 1.37*** 1.48*** 49.93*** 72.88*** 10.46*** 
 (0.17) (0.14) (14.02) (10.21) (2.95) 
Regional Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 49 49 49 47 47 
R-squared 0.381 0.378 0.252 0.684 0.534 
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 7: Urban  
 RATIO RATIO REPLACE COVERAGE PENSION 
VARIABLES LOW MEDIUM   SPENDING
      
Communitarian  -0.54*** -0.53*** 35.11*** -19.13* 1.13 
 (0.15) (0.13) (10.79) (10.26) (1.80) 
Autoritarian  -0.23 -0.24* 13.95 0.87 1.95 
 (0.14) (0.13) (8.367) (4.00) (1.35) 
Egalit Nuclear  -0.41** -0.48*** 32.40*** -0.49 5.49*** 
 (0.16) (0.12) (8.41) (4.15) (1.51) 
Urban -3.24e-06 -1.30e-06 0.00 0.00*** 9.14e-05***
 (2.39e-06) (2.54e-06) (0.00) (0.00) (2.74e-05) 
Constant 1.81*** 1.63*** 26.66 22.22* -0.62 
 (0.24) (0.23) (21.14) (13.23) (2.44) 
Regional Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 55 50 55 64 73 
R-squared 0.338 0.382 0.208 0.753 0.541 
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 8: Democracy 
 RATIO RATIO REPLACE COVERAGE PENSION 
VARIABLES LOW MEDIUM   SPENDING
      
Communitarian  -0.66** -0.54** 44.77** -37.60*** -3.72 
 (0.30) (0.24) (21.40) (8.63) (2.63) 
Autoritarian  -0.33* -0.35** 17.42 0.71 2.24* 
 (0.18) (0.15) (11.17) (4.69) (1.19) 
Egalit Nuclear  -0.33 -0.45*** 28.93*** -9.37** 2.44* 
 (0.20) (0.13) (9.30) (3.65) (1.37) 
polity2_1900 -0.00 0.00 0.11 0.44 -0.09 
 (0.01) (0.00) (0.95) (0.36) (0.09) 
Constant 1.75*** 1.58*** 48.09** 60.68*** 9.34*** 
 (0.23) (0.19) (18.91) (6.76) (2.57) 
Regional Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 34 33 34 39 45 
R-squared 0.265 0.355 0.275 0.863 0.535 
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 9: GDP and Share of Elderly 
 RATIO RATIO REPLACE COVERAGE PENSION 
VARIABLES LOW MEDIUM   SPENDING
      
Communitarian  -0.58*** -0.59*** 38.07*** -14.76*** 0.91 
 (0.18) (0.14) (11.53) (4.59) (1.43) 
Autoritarian  -0.20 -0.23* 12.51 -4.33 0.46 
 (0.14) (0.13) (8.79) (3.89) (1.13) 
Egalit Nuclear  -0.36** -0.48*** 31.28*** -13.02*** 2.24 
 (0.17) (0.12) (8.84) (4.15) (1.35) 
Share of Elderly -0.00 
(0.00) 
-0.00 
(0.00) 
0.05 
(0.97) 
2.65*** 
(0.42) 
0.67*** 
(0.10) 
Ln GPDpc -0.06 -0.06 5.81* 5.65*** 0.41 
 (0.04) (0.05) (3.41) (1.83) (0.32) 
Constant 2.23*** 2.13*** -6.65 -18.35 -4.45* 
 (0.48) (0.54) (33.20) (15.49) (2.50) 
Regional Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 54 49 54 65 75 
R-squared 0.350 0.393 0.204 0.885 0.742 
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 10: Electoral rules and forms of government 
 RATIO RATIO REPLACE COVERAGE PENSION 
VARIABLES LOW MEDIUM   SPENDING
      
Communitarian  -0.40* -0.49** 18.85 -36.62*** -3.31* 
 (0.20) (0.19) (11.57) (10.75) (1.66) 
Autoritarian  -0.09  -0.18 0.36 -12.96* -1.37 
 (0.22)  (0.20) (10.05) (7.55) (1.42) 
Egalit Nuclear  -0.29 -0.44** 19.11** -18.71** 1.90 
 (0.19) (0.16) (7.29) (7.11) (1.54) 
Majoritarian  0.19 
(0.19) 
0.09 
(0.17) 
-17.50***
(6.15) 
-15.60** 
(7.45) 
-3.83*** 
(1.00) 
Presidential -0.17 -0.15 1.66 -8.65 -1.00 
 (0.16) (0.15) (9.59) (6.41) (0.67) 
Constant 1.49*** 1.52*** 57.46*** 77.94*** 10.46*** 
 (0.22) (0.19) (13.24) (10.69) (1.79) 
Regional Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 41 39 41 46 52 
R-squared 0.257 0.339 0.255 0.736 0.584 
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 11: Individual Preferences and strength of anecestors’ family ties 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 social security government old age retirement benefit
VARIABLES spending responsability spending spending 
     
communitarian -0.001 -0.284* -0.201*** -0.246*** 
 (0.027) (0.143) (0.053) (0.059) 
authoritarian -0.024 -0.150 -0.090* -0.069* 
 (0.020) (0.098) (0.052) (0.036) 
egalitarian nuclear -0.066** -0.225* -0.213*** -0.111*** 
 (0.032) (0.111) (0.029) (0.034) 
age -0.013*** 0.029*** -0.014** -0.014** 
 (0.002) (0.008) (0.005) (0.005) 
age squared 0.000*** -0.000** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
male 0.126*** 0.060 0.152*** 0.115*** 
 (0.010) (0.067) (0.015) (0.023) 
income 0.007* 0.028** 0.024*** 0.031*** 
 (0.004) (0.013) (0.004) (0.007) 
education 0.037*** 0.075*** 0.057*** 0.074*** 
 (0.006) (0.010) (0.006) (0.007) 
liberal -0.046*** -0.217 -0.218*** -0.097** 
 (0.009) (0.134) (0.032) (0.041) 
conservative 0.122*** 0.241*** 0.227*** 0.145*** 
 (0.010) (0.067) (0.040) (0.049) 
unemployed 0.008 -0.344 -0.113 -0.144 
 (0.020) (0.216) (0.090) (0.118) 
retired -0.027** 0.125 -0.012 -0.049 
 (0.012) (0.140) (0.070) (0.044) 
other occupation 0.030*** 0.054 -0.002 -0.016 
 (0.011) (0.071) (0.042) (0.047) 
Constant 1.200*** 0.584** 1.014*** 1.631*** 
 (0.110) (0.237) (0.147) (0.142) 
Year fixed effects YES YES YES YES 
Observations 17,161 844 3,090 2,474 
R-squared 0.067 0.110 0.123 0.107 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 12: Individual Preferences in Finland, Portugal and the UK 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES UK Portugal Finland 
    
authoritarian 0.511*** 0.197 -0.115 
 (0.181) (0.257) (0.156) 
age 0.029 -0.058* 0.077*** 
 (0.027) (0.031) (0.029) 
age squared -0.000 -0.000** -0.001*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
male 0.043 0.043 -0.346** 
 (0.176) (0.215) (0.156) 
Medium Education -0.083 -0.054 -0.347** 
 (0.192) (0.305) (0.175) 
High Education -0.256 -0.457 -0.243 
 (0.263) (0.416) (0.236) 
Medium Income -0.000 -0.024 -0.354* 
 (0.219) (0.261) (0.196) 
High Income -0.400* -0.325 -0.565*** 
 (0.223) (0.314) (0.195) 
Left 0.764***  1.187*** 
 (0.274)  (0.228) 
Center  -0.323 
(0.316) 
 
Constant 5.034*** 8.227*** 5.113*** 
 (0.603) (0.871) (0.579) 
    
Observations 927 524 949 
R-squared 0.027 0.038 0.056 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Family Types
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Figure 3: The Redistributive Design of Pensions: Medium Ratio
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Figure 4: Legal Origins
 CEPRA WORKING PAPER 
 
 
 
 
 
01/2012 
V. Galasso, P. Profeta, When the state mirrors the family : the design of pension systems 
 
 
 
